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DIVINE CAUSATION 
Richard T. McClelland and Robert J. Deltete 
Quentin Smith has argued that it is logically impossible for there to be a 
divine cause of the universe. His argument is based on a Humean analysis 
of causation (confined to event causation, specifically excluding any consid-
eration of agency) and a principle drawn from that analysis that he takes to 
be a logical requirement for every possibly valid theory of causation. He 
also thinks that all divine volitions are efficacious of logical necessity. We 
argue that all of these claims are faulty, and that theists can resist Smith's 
arguments without merely begging the question in favor of a divine cause. 
Introduction 
In a recent paper, Quentin Smith has advanced the claim that it is logically 
impossible for there to be a divine cause of the universe (hereinafter oeU).' 
He gives two lines of reasoning for this claim, the first of which tries to 
establish what we take to be the conclusion that such divine causes are 
prima facie impossible, and the second of which attempts to reach a more 
substantive result. According to the first line of argument, there being a 
oeu is inconsistent with "all extant definitions of causality;" according to 
the second line of argument, a oeu is inconsistent with "a logical require-
ment upon these and all possible valid definitions or theories of causality. "2 
That logical requirement, in tum, is a principle (hereinafter called P) which 
says that "For any two particular events or states x and y, if x is a logically 
sufficient condition of y, then x is not a cause of y." 3 We think that the 
best reading of P is this: letting (a) stand for the claim that event c is the 
cause of event e, and letting (b) stand for the claim that event c is not a logi-
cally sufficient condition of event e, then P= not-(b) entails not-(a). The 
argument here, then, continues that since God is omnipotent, meaning that 
"God can do everything that is logically possible 4," anything that God 
wills to do always and of logical necessity occurs. Thus, God's willing that 
the Big Bang occurs (supposing that the Big Bang is coterminous with the 
creation of the universe ') is necessarily efficacious. Given Smith's princi-
ple P, the conclusion is that God cannot be a cause of the universe. It fur-
ther follows that traditional teleological and cosmological arguments for 
the existence of God really amow1t to arguments against God's existence. 
Classical theism is thus found to be, paradoxically, a rich source of atheistic 
proofs. Indeed, since classical theism requires that God be understood as a 
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oeu, theism turns out to be necessarily false. 
Smith's arguments proceed under various assumptions other than P. 
One is that only event causation is to be considered. In particular, Smith 
excludes any consideration of so-called agent causation, for reasons impor-
tant enough to quote at length: 
Considerations of agent causality are not germane to our discussion: 
our topic is the cause of the universe's beginning to exist, not the 
cause of God's act of willing that the universe begin to exist. We are 
not examining the relation between God (the agent) and his act of 
willing (the effect), but the relation between his act of willing (an 
event) and the beginning of the universe (another event). Thus, defi-
nitions of agent causality are irrelevant to our arguments: we are 
interested only in definitions of event causality, where the cause and 
effect are both events. 6 
The effect of this move is to set up a schema according to which God is dis-
tinguished from God's volitions, and God's volitions are distinguished 
from one of their effects, namely the Big Bang (thus: God-volition-BB), 
and according to which only the latter two elements need to be considered. 
(A similar schema appears elsewhere in Smith's writings, together with his 
view that while a divine volition might explain the Big Bang, the divine 
volition itself is left unexplained, a mere brute fact. Thus, the connection 
between the divine volition and the divine agent whose volition it is, has 
no explanatory value and can be partitioned off from the over-arching 
account of (alleged) divine causation of the universe. 7) Another assump-
tion of Smith's arguments is univocity: it is his view that causal relations 
can be encompassed by a single definition (or theory) that lays down nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for one event to be the cause of another. A 
third assumption is that causation is to be understood basically in terms of 
the Humean tradition; and it is with this tradition that Smith begins his 
preliminary argument. 
We think that all three of these assumptions are mistaken, and that 
therefore Smith's preliminary argument fails. We also think that his more 
fundamental argument (based on P and a premise stating the necessary 
efficacy of all divine volitions) can be resisted without merely begging the 
question in favor of a DCU. While we recognize that this does nothing to 
show that there is a DCU, we think that Smith has failed to show that it is 
logically impossible for there to be a oeu. We further think that the man-
ner in which Smith fails to establish his main thesis betrays misunder-
standings of the nature of causality and of classical theism. We shall pro-
ceed by taking issue with Smith's preliminary argument, and then with the 
argument based on P. 
Part One: The Humean Argument. 
A. The argument: 
Smith's prima facie case proceeds in three stages: a review of the Humean 
theory of causality, a review of non-Humean theories of causation with a 
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view to closing off this way of rescuing the possibility of a DCU, and a 
review of various alleged ways in which a classical theist might escape the 
Humean argument. Let us consider each of these stages of the argument in 
more detail. 
According to Hume, Smith claims, there are three requirements for one 
event to be related to another as cause to effect: (a) temporal priority; (b) 
spatio-temporal contiguity; and (c) constant conjunction or nomological 
relatedness.8 These three conditions are taken to be individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient for one event to be the cause of another. According to 
Smith, moreover, a oeu will fail at least (b) and (c). If we take God to be a 
temporally conditioned entity, then God's willing the Big Bang can be tem-
porally prior to that event, thereby satisfying (a). Since such a formulation 
is certainly possible, and arguably better than the Boethian construal of 
atemporal eternality, Smith has little objection on this score. However, on 
just about any interpretation, classical theism holds that God is a non-spatial 
being, so that God's willing the Big Bang lacks spatial location, and thus 
fails to satisfy condition (b). Similarly, Smith argues, since God is a super-
natural being, God's willing the Big Bang cannot be governed by any natur-
allaws, and thus fails the condition of nomological relatedness, where that 
is understood in a broadly Hempelian way. Indeed, since God is omnipo-
tent, Smith thinks that God's willings would be logically sufficient to bring 
about their effects without any reference to covering laws. Therefore, since 
God's willing the Big Bang fails two of the three Humean requirements for 
"is a cause," God's willing cannot be a cause of the universe. 
Turning to more contemporary theories of causation, Smith considers 
three possibilities: (1) singularist theories such as that of J.e. Ducasse; (2) 
transference (or, as we prefer, transmission) theories (Castaneda, Fair and 
the like); and (3) counterfactual theories such as that of David Lewis. With 
regard to the first, Smith notes that a DCU is plausibly taken to be a case of 
singularist causation, since the creation of the universe (construed as creatio 
originans ) is plausibly thought to be a Lmique event. However, he goes on 
to argue that such a view will not avail the theist because it still requires 
spatia-temporal contiguity, which a DCU fails. Similarly, transference the-
ories are of no use because God is not a physical entity, so that there is 
nothing physical (e.g. energy) for God to transmit or transfer in creating 
the universe. Moreover, it is no good transmitting something non-physi-
cal, "since the Big Bang is wholly physical." Finally, according to Smith, a 
DCU fails to fit Lewis' theory because of God's omnipotence: the act of an 
omnipotent being is necessarily efficacious, so that God's willing the Big 
Bang is also necessarily efficacious; and necessarily efficacious events can-
not support the counterfactual relation between cause and effect which his 
theory presupposes. At this point in the argument, Smith concludes that 
any alternative theory of causation will likely include some condition that 
a DCU violates, either because of divine incorporeality, divine omnipo-
tence, or the supernatural character of God. It therefore seems unlikely 
that a DCU can satisfy any theory of causation which has developed in the 
modem period on the basis laid down by Hume. 
Having reviewed Hume's theory of causation and its modem epigoni, 
Smith considers three ways-each, he claims, more or less ad hoc-in 
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which a theist might resist his argument thus far. The first trades on the 
fact that the argument is strictly inductive: a theist may insist that the best 
theory of causation has yet to tum up, that a DCU is still logically possible. 
Secondly, the theist might insist that a DCU is, after all, unique, and that 
we should therefore cobble together a theory of causation to fit it, i.e., a the-
ory that is singularist, non-contiguous, and non-nomological. Thirdly, a 
theist might argue that causation is a primitive concept which cannot be 
supplied with a theory at all. In that case, the failure of a DCU to fit some 
univocal definition of "is a cause" is relatively harmless. Although none of 
these three moves seems satisfactory, Smith explicitly argues against only 
the third. His reply is that this move is merely question-begging, since a 
theist cannot give any reason for making it that is independent of the theis-
tic claim that there is a DCU. 9 We take it that Smith would regard the 
other two moves as similarly question-begging. 
At this stage, we make three observations about Smith's argument. 
The first is that it relies heavily on the Humean tradition of theories of cau-
sation. Second, the entire argument proceeds under the assumption of uni-
vocity, namely, that "is a cause" can be satisfactorily defined by a single set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions. Third, a very important assumption 
Smith appeals to repeatedly is that divine omnipotence requires that all 
divine volitions are necessarily efficacious and that this necessity is a logi-
cal necessity. We think that all three of these assumptions are dubious, 
and our reply to the first line of Smith's argument for his main thesis is to 
give reasons for so thinking. 
B. Reply to the Humean Argument: 
1. Concerning univocity: 
We doubt that it is possible to give a univocal definition for "is a cause." 
Certainly no one has offered a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
causation that has commanded universal assent among philosophers. 
More importantly, we know of no theory that can account for the many 
kinds of causal relations and the explanations which they generate or to 
which they belong. Historical explanations, for example, seem to demand 
singularist causation. The events in question here are unique and unre-
peatable; and yet it would be perverse to suggest that they have no expla-
nations or that these explanations are not causal. But these causal explana-
tions do not conform to covering-law theories of causality. 10 Likewise, if 
mental states are causes of the actions of intentional agents, as we suppose 
them to be, and if mental states are not spatio-temporal entities, as we also 
suppose them to be, then intentional causal explanations of the actions of 
agents are most unlikely to be easily accommodated to any of the standard 
theories of causality to which we appeal in cases of physical causation. 11 It 
is therefore misguided, in our view, to insist that "is a cause" be given a 
univocal definition, despite the drawing power of such a proposal. 
Since the days of Socrates there has been a strong tendency in Western 
philosophy to define leading concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, and to require that these conditions cover all uses of those con-
cepts. But there are many philosophically interesting concepts which do 
not respond well to this demand. It is notoriously difficult to give neces-
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sary and sufficient conditions for such things as "friendship", "love", 
"agency", "mind", "behavior", or "being." We also think that it is undesir-
able and unreasonable to try to give univocal definitions of such concepts. 
This is not to suggest, however, that there are not such things as common 
properties or even universals. But, like Wittgenstein, we think that the 
search for generality can sometimes be spurious, and that insistence upon a 
univocal definition for "is a cause" is an instance of this spurious generaliz-
ing. It is much more likely that, as in Wittgenstein's famous example of "is 
a game," our concepts of causality bear family resemblances to one anoth-
er, than that they can be contained in a single univocal definition. If so, 
then the failure of a oeu to match up with a univocal definition of "is a 
cause" (whether Humean or otherwise) is considerably less damaging than 
Smith allows. 12 
2. Against the Humean requirements: 
There is no doubt that Hume took himself to be offering a theory or defini-
tion of causality, and that he supposed temporal priority, spatio-temporal 
contiguity, and constant conjunction to be both necessary and sufficient for 
the application of "is a cause." Moreover, as is generally agreed, Hume 
certainly supposed that the third requirement excluded any necessary rela-
tionships between causes and their effects. Indeed, it was the main burden 
of Hume's critique of our common sense notions of causality that there can 
be no such necessary relationships between causes and effects. And he 
almost certainly construed this necessity as strict logical necessity. Thus 
there is, according to Hume, no contradiction in supposing that some 
causal event occurs and the usual and expected effect event does notY 
However, Hume's own requirements for "is a cause" have drawn a good 
deal of fire, and, as we will show, are very dubious. 14 The failure of a oeu, 
then, to satisfy the Humean requirements, whether in their original eigh-
teenth-century form or in more modern dress, is less momentous than 
Smith supposes. 
2 (a): On Temporal Priority: 
It seems that some causes are simultaneous with their effects. For example, 
it is widely held that what physicists call "the collapse of the wave packet" 
on the quantum level represents "an instantaneous change of state over a 
large area" of space-time.1" On the macro-Ievet Wesley Salmon gives the 
example of a pulse of white light passing through a red-filter: " .. .it is the 
intersection of the white light pulse with the red filter that produces the red 
light, and the light becomes red at the very time of its passage through the 
filter."16 Jom, Lucas refers to similar cases, such as the coloring of copper 
sulphate by the light which interacts with it, and the like. It thus appears 
that simultaneity is just as fundamental a relation between some causes 
and their effects as is temporal priority for other causal relations. The 
upshot is that, even in cases of physical causation, strict temporal priority 
is not a necessary condition, as Hume held it to be. 
The relationship of this Humean requirement to the theistic claim that 
there is a DCU is complex. It depends partly on how we resolve the debate 
over divine eternality. As is well known, there have been two main concep-
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tions of divine eternality: the traditional Boethian one, in which God is con-
ceived of as a strictly atemporal being, with neither temporal location nor 
duration; and the omnitemporal (or "transtemporal," as Lucas has called it) 
view, according to which God is temporally conditioned but exists fully at 
every moment of time.17 We think that the arguments favor the omnitem-
poralist view. However, when it comes to the creation of the universe, per-
haps the more relevant issue is simultaneity. For creation is not taken by 
theists to be the operation of the divine agent upon some pre-existing mat-
ter. According to classical theism, God creates the universe "out of noth-
ing" and not, as Plato's demiurge, by rearranging something that already 
exists. IS Accordingly, it seems that if God is to be a DCU, the divine cause 
must be simultaneous with its effect (the coming to be of the universe). 
Moreover, this seems to be so regardless of which view one takes of divine 
eternality. However, in so far as the Boethian atemporalist view has diffi-
culty handling the concept of simultaneity, it is at a disadvantage. l " 
Smith might reply that God is not a physical being (whether atemporal 
or omnitemporal) and thus that Salmon's and Lucas' examples of simulta-
neous causation are not strictly relevant. But this is beside the point. 
Hume constructed his theory of causality to handle physical cases (at the 
macro-level, recalling the famous billiard balls), and the Salmon and Lucas 
examples refute this part of that theory. The theory stands or falls on the 
basis of physical cases. Moreover, if mental states and other intentional 
states are not spatio-temporal or physical entities, and yet can have causal 
influence, then incorporeality is not a barrier to causality.20 
We conclude, then, that Hume's requirement of temporal priority does 
not hold up even in cases of ordinary physical causation, whether at the 
micro-level of quantum effects, or at the macro-level. A believer in the pos-
sibility of a DCU is free to reject this requirement. Thus far, then, the 
Humean approach raises no insurmountable barrier to there being a DCU. 
2(b): Concerning contiguity and continuity: 
Hume himself requires that causes be strictly contiguous with their effects, 
both spatially and temporally (the latter is part of his first requirement: 
temporal priority). The notion of contiguity belongs with Hume's atom-
ism, and in so far as that atomism is implausible, we have little motivation 
to accept contiguity. Hume thought that the contiguity requirement was 
given in our experience, and arises therefrom by way of an inevitable, irre-
sis table and veridical idea of that experience. As such, it belongs to his the-
ory of ideas and to his treahnent of the relationship between ideas and lan-
guage.2l Probably more directly germane to our discussion is the relation 
between Hume's ideas about contiguity and the contemporaneous debate 
about" action at a distance," a debate sharpened considerably by Newton's 
theory of gravitation, which seemed to require such action. Like Leibniz, 
Hume resisted the idea of action at a distance, and the requirement of con-
tiguity insures that there can be no true action at a distance. But the possi-
bility of action at a distance has come back into physical theory as a result 
of certain quantum mechanical effects, to which we return below. 
Meanwhile, Hume's atomism and ills theory of ideas are subject to suffi-
cient difficulties to suggest that the contiguity requirement is false. More 
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importantly, we have ample reason to insist that both space and time are 
continuous, and thus that causes and their effects cannot be, strictly speak-
ing, spatially or temporally contiguous.22 
Accordingly, contemporary neo-Humeans theorists have abandoned 
the requirement of contiguity, replacing it with spatio-temporal continuity, 
a notion which fits much more comfortably with the use of field theories in 
modem physics.23 So, the Humean requirement of spatio-temporal conti-
guity is no barrier to the logical possibility of a Deu. 
However, it seems that the theistic claim still violates the neo-Humean 
requirement for spatio-temporal continuity. For while an omnitemporal 
God may satisfy the temporal aspect of this requirement, God is not a spa-
tial entity, since God lacks a physical body and is thus not spatially contin-
uous with the universe God allegedly creates. There is, however, a line of 
reply open to a theist that Smith has overlooked. It rests on two, admitted-
ly uncertain, claims: (a) that we have some reasons from physical theory to 
doubt the necessity of even spatio-temporal continuity; and (b) that we 
have some reasons from our experience of our own agency, and indepen-
dently of theism itself (to avoid begging the question), to reject the require-
ment as necessary in the case of intentional action by an agent. 
There are several results of quantum mechanics that appear to challenge 
the assumption of spatio-temporal continuity as a universal feature of nat-
urally occurring events. One is the so-called collapse of the wave packet in 
the well-known two-slit experiment.24 There is no widely agreed-upon 
interpretation of this result, though it is well-confirmed experimentally. 
But one possibility is that action at a distance does occur in nature, at least 
at the quantum level. If that is so, then the assumption of spatio-temporal 
continuity, as applied to causal sequences, is under threat. 
Another threat comes from a second quantum mechanical phenome-
non, the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. The phenomenon is 
not easily summarized in a short space, and its explanation is controver-
siaps But the general upshot of the EPR paradox is that it appears to be 
possible for two different quantum systems to influence one another when 
there is no possibility of spatio-temporally continuous causal influence 
passing between them. Once again, therefore, it appears that action at a 
distanc€---{)r what is often described as a violation of locality-occurs in 
nature, at least at the quantum level. As our knowledge of the physical 
world changes, it is possible that we will find ourselves having to reject the 
neo-Humean requirement of continuity: indeed, we may already have 
done so, for our best physical theories may already require such rejection.26 
Thus, not only is Smith's endorsement of Humean contiguity insecure, but 
so is its neo-Humean substitute, continuity. A theist could resist these 
requirements without merely begging the question in favor of a oeu. 
Our second rationale for resisting the requirements of conliguity, or of 
continuity, concerns mental causation. Recall, first of all, that the problem 
with the requirement has to do with God's incorporeality. According to 
classical theism there are two reasons for thinking that God's creative 
action does not occur at some physical distance from the world: first, 
because God lacks a spatial location, and second, because God's action 
gives rise to the world and does not merely operate upon a previously 
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existing matrix. Now, on Smith's analysis of it, the hypothesis is that the 
world results from a divine volition or act of will, i.e., an intentional state of 
the creating agent. We have to imagine, then, that an agent having no spa-
tial relation to the world nonetheless operates as a cause of the world's 
existence. One reason for thinking that this is not possible, Smith claims, is 
that it violates contiguity I continuity requirements. However, a theist 
might reply that, after alt our own intentional states are quite similar to 
what is here required for a OeD: specifically, our intentional states are 
causally efficacious, and yet have no spatia-temporal location. In these 
cases, too, the causes are operating not at some distance from their effects, 
but independently of any spatial considerations. Indeed, it is plausible to 
think that intentional states of all kinds are similar: causally effective, but 
not spatially related to their effects--or even to their bearers. If so, then 
what the theist claims about a DCD has rational support from the meta-
physics of intentional states, and this support is independent of theism.27 
It is therefore open to a theist to resist the requirements of contiguity or 
continuity, rather in the spirit of G. E. Moore's "I know that this is a hand." 
That is, we have better reason to hold onto a plausible account of the meta-
physics of intentional states, even though it violates conditions of contigui-
ty or continuity, than we do to hold onto Hume's theory of causation, or to 
more recent variants of it. And these reasons do not constitute a mere beg-
ging of the question.28 
2(c): The nomological relationship: 
The third requirement for a broadly Humean explication of "is a cause" is 
that cause and effect be nomologically related. In Hume's original theory, 
this relation is understood in terms of "constant conjunction," and it was 
this idea that replaced the common-sense notion that causes necessitate 
their effects. However, so-called "regularity theories" of causation to which 
the notion of constant conjunction gives rise have been subjected to severe 
criticism and are no longer regarded as tenable.29 Perhaps for that reason, 
Smith, following Hempel, quickly slides over to a "deductive-nomological" 
or "covering law" model for this aspect of his neo-Humean account of cau-
sation. In this model a set of statements which may be taken to describe ini-
tial conditions and another set of statements describing relevant general 
laws together form the explanation for the event in question. The occur-
rence of the event to be explained causally is derived deductively from the 
set of initial conditions and the set of general laws pertaining. 30 Smith 
thinks that a OeD is inconsistent with such a nomological condition for "is 
a cause" on two grounds: (a) that as a supernatural being, God's actions are 
not governed by natural laws of any kind; and (b) because God is omnipo-
tent and his omnipotent willings are necessarily efficacious, the occurrence 
of the Big Bang is necessary, given only that God wills it, and without any 
contribution by a "covering-Iaw."3! In reply several points can be made. 
First, the deductive-nomological (O-N) model of scientific explanation 
has itself been the subject of searching criticism.32 Without rehearsing some 
well-known counter-examples, we note that what these examples have in 
common is the problem of causal relevance. Provision of a "covering-law," 
or O-N, account does not guarantee that we have given a good causal 
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explanation of the events in question. This point can be generalized: in 
order to distinguish between covering-law, or D-N, accounts that do suc-
ceed in explaining, and those that do not, causal factors must be intro-
duced. It follows that causal explanations cannot be analyzed merely in 
terms of the canons of D-N derivations. Richard Miller has put this point 
effectively in terms of the following dilemma: 
1. Either we add causal factors to covering-law derivations (CLD's) 
or we do not. 
2. If we do not add them, a CLD (often) fails altogether to explain. 
3. If we do add them, a CLD (often) turns out to be explanatorily 
superfluous. 
4. So, (often) either a CLD fails to explain altogether, or it is explana-
torily superfluous. 
Either way, we cannot give a general analysis of explanation in terms of 
CLD's, and we cannot analyze causality in terms of D-N derivations.33 
The D-N account, then, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
a causal explanation. More relevantly to our purpose: nomological relat-
edness, understood in terms of the D-N model, is not a necessary compo-
nent of "is a cause.// 
Moreover, such critiques of the D-N model are particularly relevant to 
the actions of finite agents such as ourselves. We often make perfectly 
intelligible causal claims about our own actions without having in mind 
any relevantly applicable covering laws, much less with any ability to sup-
ply a deductive-nomological derivation for those actions. As Miller has 
said: "Surely, people are not unreasonable to identify a particular episode 
of jealousy as the cause of a particular episode of violence .... //34 Such a 
claim is intelligible and explanatory, but it neither invokes a general cover-
ing law (since none is available) nor supplies a derivation linking cause 
and effect by deductive reasoning. The relevance of these considerations to 
our immediate problem can be secured by anticipating the results of our 
argument in the next section. We there take up Smith's general dismissal 
of the relevance of agency to his inquiry into the metaphysics of divine 
causation. We think that this dismissal constitutes a serious distortion of 
the larger problem of causality and a gross misunderstanding of the meta-
physical commibnents of classical theism. Specifically, if causal explana-
tions commonly (perhaps universally) do not depend on nomological 
relatedness, in cases involving finite agents, there is no good reason to 
think that such relatedness is necessary in the case of an infinite agent. We 
think that it is unavoidable for us to model our understanding of divine 
agency on our experience of our own agency. And our own causal efficacy 
as agents does not require nomological relatedness as Smith has conceived 
it. Neither, then, should divine agency be held to the neo-Humean require-
ment of nomological relatedness in order to qualify as a genuine cause. 
The second problem Smith points to with regard to nomological related-
ness concerns the necessary efficacy of divine willings or volitions. We 
think this claim misunderstands the metaphysical commitments of classi-
cal theism. This problem will be treated in the next section of our paper, 
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together with a number of issues concerning Smith's hasty dismissal of the 
relevance of agency to our general understanding of causation. 
Part Two: Agency, Causation and Necessity. 
We have argued thus far that anyone who believes that a oeu is logically 
possible has ample warrant, resting on grounds independent from theism 
itself, for resisting Smith's neo-Humean argument against that possibility. 
Our objections to that analysis were partly global (e.g., to its univocity) and 
partly particular (that the Humean requirements are commonly violated 
by genuine cases of causation). Some of those objections will be pressed 
further in this section, especially against univocity. But our main aim here 
is to controvert the argument depending on Smith's principle P, which 
says: "For any two particular events or states x and y, if x is a logically suf-
ficient condition of y, then x is not a cause of y."35 Smith's argument goes 
as follows: 
1. P. 
2. Any divine volition is a logically sufficient condition of its inten-
tional object. 
3. So, no divine volition is a cause. 
4. So, in particular, God's willing that the Big Bang occur is not a 
cause of the Big Bang. 
This is a valid argument, but we think that both of its leading premises are 
dubious. Accordingly, we think that the argument could reasonably be 
taken to be unsound. A theist could resist the argument without merely 
begging the question in favor of a Oeu. 
1. Against P: 
We ask first "where did Smith get P?" It does not appear to be a general-
ization, for only a few examples are given and those serve only to illustrate 
what P means. Neither is any direct justificatory argument given for P. 
Rather, Smith uses his principle repeatedly to show from a variety of 
angles how the claims of theists are inconsistent with P. But this is, at 
most, a very indirect defense of P itself. It is more likely that P derives 
directly from Smith's Humean analysis of causation, upon which analysis 
rested his earlier, prima facie, argument against a OCU. As is well known, 
Hume insisted that causal relations are not logically necessary. The main 
Humean argument goes like this: if there were a logically necessary con-
nection between a cause (C) and an effect (E), then C & -E would be self-
contradictory. But, e & -E is not self-contradictory. So, there is no neces-
sary connection between e and E. Thus, for example, while it would be 
very surprising to us should water freeze when it is heated to 212 degrees 
Fahrenheit, there is no contradiction in this, for the course of nature might 
change, and a sufficiently fundamental change in the nature of water could 
result in such behavior.16 From such considerations, it is not far to Smith's 
principle P. However, we have already given reasons for doubting the 
general Humean approach to causation. Our criticism has so far been 
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largely negative. But there is a positive critique to advance, one that 
advances an alternative to the Humean perspective, according to which P 
is either false or largely irrelevant to our understanding of causation, and is 
thus not an essential part of every possibly valid definition or theory of 
causation, as Smith avers. 
According to the alternative view, natural laws, and with them causal 
relationships, are grounded in an ontology of things and their properties, 
especially their dispositional properties. These properties exist independent-
ly of our beliefs, thoughts, expectations or conventions. Dispositional prop-
erties, which imbue their bearers with their powers to bring about various 
effects under specified conditions, are real, and are not reducible to categori-
cal properties (such as spatio-temporal relations, size, shape, and so on). Of 
particular importance are those dispositional properties that are essential 
and which conj1.mctively define the natural kinds to which individual mater-
ial things belong. So construed, such properties are Lockean "real essences," 
which furnish the basis for a scientific exploration of natural kinds and of 
kinds of natural processes, and for the discovery of naturallaws.37 
On this view, natural laws are understood to supervene on essences 
and to be necessary: "Laws of nature, we argue, are truths whose necessity 
is grounded in the essential properties of this world and the things in it. 
Hence, it is not the relation between universals that constitutes the necessity 
of laws, but rather, their necessity results from the essential nature of the 
properties on which the nomological relation supervenes."38 According to 
several proponents of this view of natural laws, the concept of necessity 
used here is not the same as strict logical necessity, understood as a relation 
between propositions: " .. .for it is a contingent matter what natural kinds 
there are ... .50 a natural law, unlike a logical truth, would not be true in all 
worlds, but would be true in all worlds which contain the natural kinds 
mentioned in the law. Hence, a law possesses a kind of conditional necessi-
ty: necessity relative to the natural kinds to which it actually refers."]9 
Indeed, Harre and Madden have argued that this conditional necessity, 
which they call "natural necessity," is neither reducible to nor dependent 
upon logical necessity.4D Others in the dispositional essentialist tradition 
have argued that "natural necessity" is either just a type of logical necessity 
or entails logical necessitiesY The issues are too complex for us to resolve 
this dispute. It is agreed by all the writers in this tradition, however, that 
natural laws are epistemically contingent and are known a posteriori. 
Natural kinds can be seen as complex conjunctive properties: thus, for 
example, electrons have a charge of -1.602 x 10 -19 coloumbs, a rest mass of 
9.10908 x 10 -.11 kilograms, and a spin of +1/2 Planck units. Any possible 
world in which electrons occur has particles with these properties, and 
anything in a possible world that fails to have any of these properties can-
not be an electron. Similarly, copper has the properties of atomic number 
29, atomic weight 63.54, malleability, ductility, fusibility and electrical con-
ductivity. These properties are both dispositional and explanatory; knowl-
edge of them gives us deep insights into the range of typical causal effects 
of copper by giving us a detailed account of its nature. Anything that lacks 
this nature would not count as copper, and anything that possesses this 
cluster of properties will count as copper and necessarily manifests the 
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effects of these causal powers. In this view of things, it is properties and 
not laws that are fundamental; laws are to be explained by reference to 
properties. Indeed, Madden notes that "the concept 'x has the power to 
y' ... catches what might be called the strong sense of 'potentiality', namely, 
'what would automatically happen if interfering conditions were absent or 
taken away.'''42 
We have a good deal of sympathy with this view. It is particularly 
valuable with regard to scientific knowledge and practice. More particu-
larly, it gives what we think is a very appealing account of the nature of 
natural laws. It accounts for their objectivity, locates the difference 
between laws and mere regularities, and it explains why laws are con-
firmed by their instances and have predictive power. It is "bottom up" in 
taking natural laws to be descriptive of the essences of natural kinds (or 
derivable from laws that are), and explains nomological necessity by 
grounding it in essences.43 As Swoyer has put it: "A chief virtue of the 
property theory is that it takes widely acknowledged features of laws at 
face value and provides a better explanation of them than do its competi-
torS."44 Moreover, we think that this approach to causation allows room 
for a rich notion of the causal capacities of agents, without any need to 
invoke a special theory of agent causation.45 That development, in turn, 
furnishes a solid metaphysical basis for analogies between our own agency 
and divine agency, but without begging the truth of theism. 
What happens to Smith's principle P if this alternative approach to 
causation is adopted? There seem to be two possibilities. On the one 
hand, if the necessities ascribed to causal relations by Ellis and company 
are or entail logical necessities, then P is clearly false!6 If, on the other 
hand, natural necessities are not logical necessities and do not entail logical 
necessities, then P is not disproved; but, it does seem to follow that it is not 
essential to every possibly valid theory of causation, since P plays no spe-
cial role in dispositional essentialism. We think that Bigelow and Madden 
are right in claiming that natural necessities are not logical necessities and 
that they do not entail logical necessities. But, we do not think that P is 
essential to every possibly valid theory of causation, and we think that it 
does not illuminate the nature of many genuinely causal relationships. 
Conversely, the framework of dispositional essentialism is valuable to the-
istic philosophers precisely because it accords very well with scientific 
knowledge and practice and provides a metaphysical framework indepen-
dent of theism. 
2. Against Premise 2. 
We have several reasons for rejecting the second premise of Smith's argu-
ment, and at least one of these is closely related to-if, indeed, not a further 
instance of-our previous argument concerning the modality of causal 
necessities. 
(a) Regarding agents and their volitions: 
As we have noted earlier, Smith explicitly excludes from his investigation 
any special role for agency. We believe this tantamount to excluding a 
oeu by definition, and Smith himself gives at least two indications that he 
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cannot do so consistently. Smith's second premise has to do with divine 
volitions or willings. But volitions or willings, whatever else they may be, 
always belong to agents. Judith Jarvis Thompson has argued that the con-
ditions for identifying actions from among all other events necessarily 
include mention of the agent to which they belong.47 If, as seems reason-
able, we include volitions or willings among the actions of an agent, then 
Smith's insistence on treating only event-causation will not serve to keep 
the agent wholly out of view. Moreover, Smith's second premise makes 
the claim that each and every divine volition is necessarily efficacious. But 
this is already to make a very substantial claim about the nature of the 
agent whose volitions they are. Evidently, then, Smith already knows a 
good deal about that agent and what he knows plays a substantial role in 
his argument. It is thus entirely in order for us to insist that investigation 
of that agent's nature be taken further. But there is no way to do so short 
of consideration of our own agency, for that is the only agency which we 
experience directly.'s Smith's exclusion of agency is unjustified, then, both 
on general grounds and on the grounds of his own manner of proceeding. 
Furthermore, the claim made by theists is that God, a divine agent, is 
the originating (and sustaining) cause of the wLiverse, not that some event, 
shorn of all connection with its bearer, is the originating cause of the uni-
verse. So, unless agents are just events-which nobody thinks-, it is not 
possible to confine the discussion solely to relations between events (or 
states). The theistic claim is that God causes the universe to exist, and 
makes use of an act of will to do SO.49 Events or states are at most the prox-
imate causes of the universe. The ultimate originating cause is the divine 
agent and not merely that agent's volition. We have referred earlier to 
Smith's schema, according to which the divine agent is split off from divine 
volitions, and only one of the latter is allowed to count as a cause of the Big 
Bang. This partition is a direct result of the Humean event-ontology within 
which Smith's analysis of causation is embedded. We think that it is not 
possible correctly to understand the relations between volitions and their 
effects without also understanding the relations between those volitions 
and the agents whose volitions they are. In particular, we are unlikely to 
grasp the modal properties attaching to the volitions-effects relation with-
out also investigating the relations between volitions and agents. A second 
objection to Premise 2 should make this clear. 
(b) Agents and necessity: 
It sometimes happens among agents like ourselves that we can make 
things happen with a certain kind of necessity. The key concepts are those 
of intervention and prevention. It sometimes happens that we can arrange 
for an originating event to lead to an effect and also prevent any other 
events in the near spatia-temporal neighborhood from interfering. For 
example, we can so arrange things in the set-up of a physical experiment 
that nothing in its near neighborhood is at all likely to interfere. Indeed, 
one of the main skills of a good experimenter is to anticipate interference 
with an experiment's running and to design it so that no interference takes 
place. The modality here is practical, not logical: it is not the case that 
interference is logically impossible, and yet the outcome is in some sense 
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necessary. We call this modality "practical necessity," and we think that it 
either is an instance of the "natural necessity" explored by Harre, Madden, 
Ellis, and Bigelow, or is closely related to it. Moreover, we think that our 
experience with such practically sufficient causation is an important source 
of our concepts of alethic modality.50 Furthermore, it is at least possible 
that something analogous to practical necessity applies in the case of 
divine creation, too. 
The question we pose is this: supposing God has determined to create a 
universe, what is to prevent this determination from being carried out? Ex 
hypothesi, there can be no preventive event from the side of the universe, i.e., 
no event having a spatio-temporal location with the power to prevent the 
effects of the divine cause, because there is no universe existing indepen-
dently of that divine cause to supply it. Prevention, then, can arise only 
from within the divine volitional economy. We can think of several ways 
this might happen: (a) by virtue of a change in the divine volition (easy 
enough for an omnitemporal agent), or (b) by virtue of an inconsistency or 
other type of conflict among the divine volitions. It seems to us that it is 
logically possible for each of these things to occur (even if they never actual-
ly do), and thus that it is logically possible for the nexus of divine intention-
ality and action to be such that actual creation does not occur even though 
the will to create does. That is, we think that the unity of divine intentional-
ity is not automatic and is not a logical necessity. Rather, it is a function of 
the previous (infinite) history of the divine agent and of higher order divine 
volitions (e.g., the volition to hold steady the lower-order volition to create a 
universe).51 Happily for us, if theism is true, God's will to create did not 
suffer from any such disunity. Given, then, no universe with an indepen-
dent existence to supply a preventive event, and a unified divine intentional 
structure, the creation of the world becomes unpreventable. And what is 
unpreventably true, as Arthur Prior argued long ago, is necessarily true.52 
Moreover, in the case of a divine agent, no appeal to omnipotence need be 
made. God makes it unpreventably true that the universe exists by virtue 
of the integrity of divine intentionality. The creation of the world, on this 
view, is not so much an exhibition of divine power, as it is of divine single-
ness of purpose. The modality attaching to the divine volition to create a 
universe is not logical necessity, but practical necessity. 
It is at least possible to understand the traditional doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo in this way. And in that case, divine volitions to create a universe 
like ours are practically, but not logically sufficient for their effects. Smith 
might reply that such a view of divine agency is out of court, but he can do 
so only if he permits an extensive investigation of the nature of divine 
agency to go forward. However, his whole approach to the problem of a 
DCU prohibits such an investigation. 
(c) The problem of incompatibilist freewill: 
Consider the hapless Fredd Bloggs. It is part of the tradition of classical 
theism that God wills that Fredd Bloggs always do what is morally right. 
And yet, notoriously, Fredd does not always do what is morally right. If 
every divine volition is necessarily efficacious (as Smith holds), then Fredd 
is not free to make his way in the world contrary to the divine will. Rather, 
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he is under a metaphysical compulsion always to do what is morally right. 
Moreover, if the modality of this compulsion is logical necessity, then the 
compulsion is as strong as it can possibly be, for then it is a logical truth 
that Fredd always do what is morally right. But if Fredd is possessed of 
incompatibilist freewill, then it is genuinely "up to" Fredd whether or not 
he always does what is morally right.53 So understood, Fredd's creaturely 
freewill is in deep conflict with the view that all divine volitions are neces-
sarily efficacious. Indeed, it cannot be true that every divine volition is 
even contingently efficacious. Of course, it is true that compatibilism has 
been the dominant mode of resolving the freedom-determinism debate in 
the modem period, and that plenty of theists have been compatibilists. But 
it is certainly possible to formulate classical theism in terms of incompati-
bilist freewill, and it seems that once we do so we must reject Premise 2 as, 
at best, a gross over-generalization. 
It may be replied that our argument overlooks important distinctions 
between various types of divine volitions, and that once such distinctions 
are drawn, Smith's premise is safe. Thus, we might distinguish between 
God's antecedent willing (e.g., that all moral agents always do what is 
morally right) and God's consequent willing (what God wills, all things 
considered, including what God wills in the event that not every moral 
agent always does what is morally right). Or we might distinguish 
between God's ethical decrees and God's causal decrees, taking the former 
to be contingently efficacious and the latter to be necessarily efficacious. 
Or we might distinguish between what God decrees (generally) and what 
God desires, taking the latter to be only contingently efficacious.s4 And 
perhaps there are other ways of carving up divine volitions such that some 
types satisfy our demand for incompatibilist freewill, while other types are 
necessarily efficacious. Indeed, we would welcome such a reply, and we 
would go much further in exploring the internal structure or dynamics of 
divine intentionality. 55 But such a reply is not open to Smith. He has 
eschewed any investigation of agency, and thus cannot draw any of these 
distinctions between various kinds of divine volitions. Indeed, to appeal to 
divine omnipotence as a ground for Premise 2 is already to break the barri-
er he has erected around agency. 
We conclude, then, that a theist can have good grounds for being dis-
satisfied with Premise 2. Taken at face value, it is an over-generalization. 
But it also misconstrues the type of modality which attaches to those divine 
volitions which do necessitate their effects. That misconstruction, in tum, 
obscures what we think are important complexities attaching to divine 
intentionality. These are, of course, metaphysical speculations. But in so 
far as they rest on the metaphysics of dispositional essentialism, they can-
not be held merely to beg the question in favor of a OeD, since disposition-
al essentialism is a conceptual framework designed to account for scientific 
realism and is independent of theism. But, if Premise 2 collapses, then the 
argument which depends on it is unsound. 
Concluding Reflections. 
It remains for us to survey briefly the results of our inquiry and to suggest 
some of its wider implications. 
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(a) Smith is hasty and naIve about causation. His approach is broadly 
Humean, confined to relations between events, and univocal. The contem-
porary philosophical discussion of causation has moved beyond these 
parameters in several directions that are of special interest to theists: room 
is being made in the contemporary discussion (1) for singularist, and 
anomic causation, (2) for irreducibly probabilistic causal laws, (3) for con-
sideration of non-event based ontologies, (4) for consideration of agency as 
a particular form of singularist causation, and (5) process theories of causa-
tion have been widely developed since Salmon's (1984). In our view, 
process theories are particularly interesting to theists and others interested 
in agency as a form of singularist causation. They also have some obvious 
attraction for those drawn to the metaphysics of dispositional essentialism 
and property theories of causality.'" A convergence of these approaches 
might furnish a particularly powerful metaphysical framework of value to 
theists, not least because it is independent of theism and generates a con-
ceptually rich understanding of the natural sciences, as well as furnishing 
theists with a rich source of analogies for divine agency. The entire man-
ner in which the discussion of causation has progressed in the last two 
decades opens up possibilities that Smith has not taken into account. And 
once they are taken into account, it is no longer enough to cast even merely 
prima facie doubt on the logical possibility of a DCU by comparing it to a 
Humean and univocal analysis of "is a cause." 
(b) Smith's main argument against the logical possibility of a DCU rests 
on two premises that we think are dubious. Principle P derives from the 
broadly Humean analysis of causation which gave rise to the prima facie 
argument against a DCU. It is a fundamental principle of Humean empiri-
cism that there are no necessary connections to be found in nature. In the 
alternative perspective provided by dispositional essentialism, there are 
necessary connections to be found in nature. Depending on how these nec-
essary relations are understood (as logical necessities or as conditional 
necessities), we can argue that P is either false or superfluous. Either way, 
a theist could reject P without merely begging the question in favor of a 
DCU. At the same time, whichever way the debate over modality is 
resolved, such a theist need not deny the fundamental tenet of empiricism, 
namely that our knowledge of natural kinds is a posteriori. 57 
In a similar way, a theist could argue that the other premise of Smith's 
main argument is dubious. A case can be made that the intentional actions 
of agents sometimes necessitate their effects, and that this necessity (which 
we have called "practical necessity") is either the same as Madden and 
Ellis' "natural necessity" or analogous to it. Such necessities also attach to 
some divine volitions. One way in which Smith's Premise 2 goes wrong is 
in supposing that divine volitions logically necessitate their effects. There 
are causal necessities which are not logical necessities. Moreover, Premise 
2 is guilty of over-generalization, and subject to objections on the basis of 
incompatibilist freewill. Smith cannot block these objections without giv-
ing to agency a relevance that he has excluded from the outset of his dis-
cussion. In any case, a theist may again reject Premise 2 without merely 
begging the question in favor of a DCU. 
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(c) Smith is also hasty and naive about the tradition of classical theism. 
In dismissing agency from any consideration, and in spite of his intentions, 
he misconstrues the basic thrust of the theistic claim that the universe origi-
nates in (and is sustained by) the intentional and free action of a divine 
agent. Action always belongs to agents, and there can be no understand-
ing of the nature of an action without understanding at least something of 
the nature of its agent. One must understand the divine agency to under-
stand what is being claimed by theists (if only for the purpose of overturn-
ing that claim). And there is no understanding of divine agency, we think, 
except by way of understanding our own agency, including its modalities. 
It seems perverse to insist that the only legitimate analysis of the causal 
influence of agents and their actions is Humean. Such a strategy suggests 
that we should understand the actions of the billiard players in terms of 
what is happening on the table between the billiard balls, rather than the 
other way round. The technical developments in causal theory mentioned 
above have made it possible for us to adopt the alternative strategy, and to 
do so without merely begging the question in favor of theism and a DCU. 
(d) Our conclusion, then, is that Smith fails to establish his main thesis, 
namely that "a divine originating and sustaining cause of the universe" is 
logically impossible. We close with some final reflections for theistic 
philosophers. The first reflection has to do with omnitemporality. It is dif-
ficult to imagine what might be the characteristics of a genuinely omnitem-
poral and infinite life. We have made some claims in this essay about the 
structure of divine intentionality and various logical possibilities, some of 
which, at least, we think are never realized (e.g., it is logically possible for 
God to will and not to act, even if God never actually does so). We think 
that the conceptual resources of the omnitemporal point of view have not 
been exploited as fully as they might be to illuminate the nature of divine 
intentionality and of divine action. (An obvious source of analogies would 
be our own experience of the structures of personality and character as 
they develop over time.) The second reflection arises from a comment by 
John Lucas: "If we, as theists, believe that the universe is fundamentally 
personal in character, it follows that our ultimate understanding will not be 
in terms of things, which occupy space and mayor may not possess certain 
properties, but of persons, who characteristically do things. Action, not 
substance, will be our most important category of thought. It is a truth too 
long neglected by philosophers."31\ However, agents of our type also are 
"things which occupy space and mayor may not have certain properties". 
The metaphysics of dispositional essentialism may be a way to explore the 
nature of agency and action, as well as a way to elaborate solutions to 
problems in the philosophy of science. Even if Smith's argument finally 
fails, it is useful for pointing up the importance of approaching problems 
about theism in the light of a metaphysical framework that is common 
both to our understanding of the natural sciences and also to theism. 
Development of such common ground is, we think, incumbent upon theis-
tic philosophers if sound metaphysics is to be done (thereby avoiding 
charges of circular reasoning). Our third reflection is that if action is to be 
one of our most important categories of thought, then one of the most 
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important derivative categories of thought will be interaction, especially 
interaction between intentional agents. Analytic philosophy of religion has 
largely proceeded under the rubric of Anselmian "perfect being" theology, 
where much excellent work has been done. However, we believe that this 
framework needs (at least) to be supplemented by a new framework, one 
which is dynamic and which takes action, interaction and the conditions 
for agency, as central. One aim of the present paper, in answering Smith's 
arguments against the logically possibility of a oeu, is to suggest some of 
the lines along which such a framework might be constructed. 
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